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Abstract
The paper estimates the effect of oil price fluctuations on GDP growth,
using linear and nonlinear VAR models with data from 12 countries. It
reports strong significance for the existence of non-linear moderator effects
caused by a decline in the oil-to-energy share, which weakens the causal
effect of oil prices on economic growth. A consideration of the relationship
of oil prices and GDP over 44 years confirms the exclusion of symmetry of
previous studies. Moreover, the paper indicates that the effect of negative
oil price movements is causal for more countries than has been suggested so
far.
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1 Introduction
It has long been assumed that events in the monetary or in the oil markets con-
tribute to the outset of economic recessions. The monetary market is often char-
acterized by interventions in the credit market that are meant to influence in-
vestment behavior and may cause financial frictions. These interventions hamper
or accelerate economic growth and magnify business cycles. The oil market, or
the fluctuation in the oil price, influences economic development through several
channels. On the one side, oil prices have a direct negative effect on the output of
an economy by increasing production costs. On the other side, oil price fluctua-
tions generate uncertainty which influences investment behavior in future projects
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(Bernanke, 1980). Expectations regarding the price evolution impact business out-
looks and often lead to a deferral of new investments, which, in the medium and
long run, dampens future business development. On an aggregate level, this affects
economic growth. In the literature, along with theoretical explanations, historical
data have been analyzed to identify specific properties regarding oil prices, and
alongside related behavior of other macroeconomic variables. When based on data
from the 1980s or before, linear models have shown a significant negative relation-
ship between oil price changes and GDP growth. However, starting with the mid
1980s, oil price decreases have not had the predicted influence on macroeconomic
performance, as economic models of the time were outdated. Following a drop in
oil prices, GDP growth does not longer increase by the same amount as it would
decrease after an equivalent rise in oil price. This new type of relationship has
been modeled by changing the analysis in favor of an asymmetric relationship be-
tween oil price fluctuation and GDP growth. Starting with Mork (1989), several
economists have considered this by adopting the theory of the asymmetric rela-
tionship to non-linear models. These new models allow for distinguishing between
impacts of positive and negative oil price changes, introducing separate coefficients
for both of them (Lee et al., 1995; Hamilton, 1996).
Other insights have become possible by investigating data of a growing time
span. For example, it was suggested that the degree of correlation between oil
price changes and economic output is not constant but rather weakened over time
(Hamilton, 1996; Hooker, 1996). Depending on the respective degree of correlation,
the economy has been vulnerable, to a decreasing extend, to fluctuations in the
oil market over time. There is an ongoing debate on why the impact of oil is
diminishing. The change may either be caused by a higher flexibility in absorbing
price shocks through other macroeconomic channels, such as monetary policy.
Alternatively, the dependency on oil may have decreased in favor of a dependency
on other sources of energy, resulting in a loss of the importance of oil for the
respective economy. Indeed, since the 1970s, oil shares have decreased in many
economies, in particular in oil demanding countries without own meaningful oil
production, as will be investigated in this study.
The present paper contributes to existing literature in two ways. First, we
investigate the weakening relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth.
We hypothesize that a lowering of the oil-to-energy share, which comes with a
decreasing dependency on oil, leads to this weakening relationship between oil
price changes and GDP growth. Thereby, we look at the effect of a change in the
oil-to-energy share as a moderator effect. Second, we extend the time horizon to
2014, enabling the reestimation of previous studies. In particular, the data include
the transition into the 21st century, with strong increases in oil prices up to levels
beyond those of the 1970s.
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These objectives have gained importance as in recent years extreme fluctuations
of oil prices, as well as major reforms regarding new ways of energy production
have been taking place in many countries. The first of the two objectives has
partly been dealt with by Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005). However, our
study not only contributes to existing literature by extending the analysis to a
time span including the years of the financial crisis and up to 2014. On top of
that, it is, to our knowledge, the first paper to describe and quantify moderator
effects on the relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth. By also
considering the possibility of existence of asymmetric effects of oil price changes
on GDP growth, we do not limit the analysis to linear models.
The results of this paper confirm the assumption that changes in oil prices
Granger cause GDP growth for most countries. This holds for both, net-oil-
consuming and net-oil-producing economies. By allowing for asymmetry in the
effect of positive and negative price movements on economic growth, we further
indicate that effects of negative oil price movements are more important for some
countries than assumed before. In spite of that, magnitudes of positive or nega-
tive responses are not equal which supports the original assumption of asymmetric
effects by oil price changes. However most important, we find evidence for the ex-
istence of a non-linear moderator effect, with the oil-to-energy share acting as the
moderator variable. This significant moderator effect explains that a decline in
the oil-to-energy share weakens the causal effect of oil price changes on economic
growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of existing litera-
ture examining the relationship between oil prices and GDP growth. It summarizes
models which assume asymmetric effects of oil prices, explaining the focus on non-
linear instead of linear models. Section 3 reflects the historical development of oil
shares in different countries to determine whether their paths have been changing.
Section 4 describes the present dataset and introduces the model setting including
the moderator effect. Section 5 presents the empirical results and analyzes them.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Effects of Oil Price Changes on Economic Growth
Price fluctuations in the global oil market and sensitivity of economies faced by
them have resulted in large body of research considering the role of oil with respect
to the macroeconomy, in particular along with two oil crises in the mid and end
1970s. Reasons for fluctuation in the oil price might be caused economically, po-
litically, or others. But unlike microeconomic theory tells us, the general principal
of pricing, saying that prices are a result from the equilibrium of supply and de-
mand, cannot be always applied to this commodity. Since a number of recessions
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have been preceded by extraordinary peaks in the oil price market, it is a topical
issue covered in research of economic development and growth dealing with the
relationship between prices and economic output.
Side by side theoretical and empirical studies have been evolved to analyze
the role of exhaustible resources such as oil and coal over the business cycle. On
the theoretical side, noticeable work has been published by Stiglitz (1974) who
implements a general non-renewable resource to a basic Cobb-Douglas economy
solving for the optimal growth path. Noteworthy, the analysis by Dasgupta and
Heal (1974) examines how depletion of a finite product should optimally set when
allowing for substitution between exhaustible resources and other reproducible in-
puts. Bernanke (1980) and Bernanke et al. (1997) analytically investigate the
effects of price fluctuation of resources on investment behavior and responses by
monetary authorities. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) pick up new empirical find-
ings to analyze job creation and destruction with respect to oil price changes.
They find that oil price fluctuation causes twice as much variability in employ-
ment growth than monetary shocks. Summing up, the theoretical results explain
the effects of changes in oil prices either by influencing the production and con-
sumption of an economy directly or by intensifying uncertainty such as on the
investment behavior.
2.1 Symmetric and Linear Effects of Oil Prices
On the empirical side, an influential study has been published by Hamilton (1983)
based on the six-variable system by Sims (1980). He extends the model observing
the relationship of several main macroeconomic variables and movements in the oil
price. He finds strong significance for negative correlation between rising oil prices
and seven of eight post-war recessions in the U.S. between 1948-1972. Accordingly,
he concludes that the main oil price shocks have had a significant impact on aggre-
gated economic levels. But moreover, he finds no significance for oil-prices alone
Granger causing economic downturns but being affected by other macroeconomic
channels such as monetary intervention as well. Due to its simplicity but also
its explanatory power, Hamilton’s linear model has a strong influence on business
cycles theory and its way to simulate models such as Eichenbaum and Singleton
(1986), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), and McCallum (1988).
2.2 Asymmetric and Nonlinear Effects of Oil Prices
Until the early 1980s, when oil prices have faced mainly in upwards direction, linear
models have performed reasonably well. But with frequent ups and downs as well
as considerable drops in prices in the 1980s, the theory of linearity between oil price
changes and economic growth has been revised.!!! Despite of decreasing oil prices,
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economic growth has not reflected the prediction. In fact, it turned out that there
is a non-symmetric relationship between both variables. Price declines have been
followed by only weak enhances or even negative economic developments. Meeting
that, Mork (1989) finds strong significance for asymmetric impacts on economic
growth in the U.S. between 1949 and 1988. On the one side he identifies large
negative effects of oil price increases but on the other side oil price decreases do
not show any significant effect. His study (hereafter called: asymmetric approach)
distinguishes between positive and negative linear changes in the oil price with no
further modification. The results have been confirmed for the majority of other
industrial countries (Mork et al., 1994). However, it has been sporadically criti-
cized that the usage of asymmetric linear approaches is not consistent to explain
the role of oil in the macroeconomic business cycle (Hooker, 1996). In fact, the
main criticism has been to weight the pre-1980 period too much in disfavor of the
1980s and 1990s leading to a underrepresentation of observations for the latter.
Subsequently, other economists proposed alternative methods to match asymmet-
ric behavior. Similar to Mork, two leading contributions by Lee et al. (1995) and
Hamilton (1996) handle asymmetry by exploiting nonlinearities. They construct
nonlinear transformations of oil prices while at the same time maintaining Granger
causality to other macroeconomic variables. It is commonly argued in the liter-
ature that these approaches do not replace the symmetric methodology but are
also valid for the pre-1980 period. However, this period lacked of information by
facing only price increases and considerably less fluctuation wherefore both, linear
and non-linear asymmetric instruments lead to significant results.
To be more specific, Lee et al. (1995) incorporate changes in oil prices by
normalizing these with regard to price variability. This transformation, called
scaled specification, is obtained by a GARCH model. The measurement allows to
distinguish between oil price movements which appear sharply but frequently and
movements which are small but sporadic. Hence, the degree to which an oil shock
affects the economy is measured according to its appearance with respect to time
and amplitude. The degree of impact from an equal oil price shock is higher in a
stable environment with unexpected movements than in a noisy one. The authors
argue that the failure of linear relationship stems from the price volatility since
the 1980s which has not been observed before.
Hamilton (1996) replies to the criticism from Hooker (1996) by comparing the
actual oil price with the maximum value from the previous four quarters. If the
current value is higher, then the percentage change over previous year maximum
is plotted, otherwise it is zero. Hence, this transformation, called net oil price
increase, does not deal with quarterly price changes generally. This allows to
consider many price changes as a correction to earlier price adjustments without
directly affecting economic growth.
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Both transformations have in common that they aim to modify the determina-
tion of price changes rather than just precluding negative or positive price changes
by their sign. In the following years, these three methods have been established
in various studies extended by further economies and time periods. Despite of
criticism, recent literature has repeatedly confirmed the nonlinear relationship be-
tween oil price changes and economic growth (Ferderer, 1997; Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez
and Sa´nchez, 2005; Herrera and Pesavento, 2009). Ferderer’s focus is on price
volatility of oil measured on a daily variance with respect to monthly averages.
Additionally he focuses on the extend of reaction of monetary policy due to oil
price volatility. Ferderer confirms asymmetric results which have been found in
previous studies. Moreover his study confirms the theory stating that monetary
policy is sensitive to oil price changes between 1970 and 1990 but contradicts that
these reactions are more restrictive following an oil price increase. Consequently,
monetary policy does not explain the asymmetry puzzle. Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and
Sa´nchez confirm asymmetry by focusing on European countries. Using a vari-
ance decomposition analysis, they argue that oil price shocks are a considerable
source of volatility for many macroeconomic variables. Their analysis is close to
our study by looking at a similar selection of countries as well as covering some
common methods. Herrera and Pesavento (2009) investigate, among others, in
how far changes in the dynamic response of GDP growth by oil price shocks can
explain the decline in volatility of the U.S. economy. Herrera and Pesavento (2009)
find that magnitude but also duration of the response of GDP growth by oil price
shocks have diminished during 1980s and -90s.
We will revert to the three main transformation methods by Mork (1989),
Lee et al. (1995), and Hamilton (1996) in our study. An evaluation of different
modification methods has been done by Hamilton (2003). He investigates some
existing asymmetric solutions to identify which specification is the best. To do
this, he applies several tests for stability of coefficients on oil prices. He concludes
that Lee et al.’s scaled specification works out the best with regard to historical
U.S. data, performing slightly better than the net oil price increase covering three
years. This paper finds similar results.
A problem to deciphering causal effects of oil price movements to economic
growth lies in the wide acceptance of oil price formation being endogenous with
respect to other macroeconomic forces. To consider this, Hamilton (2003) isolates
the exogenous components of the oil price with respect to its effect on growth
by identifying and controlling for a number of military conflicts in the observed
time horizon. These events are assumed to be exogenous with regard to the US
economy and resulted to a shortage of oil affecting the supply side of the econ-
omy. However, a weak assumption says that the lack of exogeneity should not
be overvalued due to the lagged response of oil prices with respect to changes in
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macroeconomic conditions. Kilian (2008) remarks that recursively identified VAR
is a well-selected approach to deal with the relationship of oil-prices and economic
growth, independent of the degree of transformed prices.
The concept of asymmetry is still ambiguous. Whereas non-linearity has never
been questioned after its implementation in specifications like Lee et al. (1995)
and Hamilton (1996), the support of asymmetry has decreased. Recently, occa-
sional empirical studies have reconsidered the concept of combined non-linearity
and asymmetry in the relationship between oil prices and other macroeconomic
variables. Kilian and Vigfusson (2013) reestimate U.S. real GDP from oil prices,
using an asymmetric approach and net oil price increases. By applying a modi-
fication of these methods, they confirm non-linearity but contradict asymmetry.
They conclude that the empirical success of the Hamilton approach is due to non-
linearity features rather than to asymmetry. Alternatively, they find significant
support for non-linear symmetry by focusing on the question whether oil prices
deviate from their most recent extreme values instead of distinguishing between
positive or negative oil price changes, called net oil price change1.
3 Historical Development of Oil Shares
The literature covering the relationship between oil price changes and economic
growth with respect to a dynamic energy mix is rare. By considering energy ratios,
literature mainly refers to the proportion of energy relative to other production
factors such as labor or capital, hence, energy intensity. Kilian (2008) points out
that the energy share, defined as the nominal valued added in oil and gas extraction
divided by nominal GDP, is irrelevant in regression estimates because they do not
fluctuate sufficiently on a quarterly basis. Hooker (2002) concludes that the sharp
decline in pass-through to core inflation caused by oil price changes results from
the declining energy intensity. However, the oil-to-energy has not been considered,
and consequently the possibility of substitution of oil with respect to an alternative
energy source.
By contrast, the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth
has been dealt with in a wide range of literature. On the one side, the substitution
or complementation between both variables is considered (Griffin and Gregory,
1976; Acaravci and Ozturk, 2010; Belke et al., 2011). The findings show mixed
evidence on the causal relations of both variables depending on the economet-
ric methodology or specific conditions concerning the selection of the observation
sample. Among others, these include manifold consumption patterns or variations
in the structure and stage of economic development. According to Payne (2010)
1Hamilton (1996) combines extreme deviation from most recent extreme values but does not
exclude to distinguish between positive and negative changes.
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this disunity does not allow for a classification of individual groups of countries
to be energy dependent or energy-neutral. Stern (2011) provides an overview on
several studies which analyze the causality between energy and GDP by applying
cointegration methods with differing results according to time frames, methodolo-
gies, regions and measures. Despite inconsistent results, he concludes that both,
energy use and output are tightly coupled, especially when putting more weight
on the most recent studies.
On the other side, it is indisputable that sustained growth over a longer period
goes along with a growing demand for energy. From the theoretical viewpoint, a
production process is usually described by consisting of input factors such as capital
and labor. In mainstream economic growth theory it is often underestimated
that energy also accounts for part of the production. However, considering recent
development it is hard to deny that the intensity of energy relative to GDP has
decreased over time. Hence, it accounts for a lower proportion in the production
function today due to technological progress and more efficient usage of energy.
Consequently, an increase in aggregated output does not automatically mean a
proportional rise in the usage of energy.
While overall energy demand has shown a long-term increasing trend, especially
since its appreciation and usage in the industrial revolution through coal and oil, its
composition with regard to non-renewable and renewable raw resources has varied
over time. Numerous factors have had influence on this shifting such as avail-
ability of resources, technological progress, innovations, or market- and political
influence. The ecological economists Tahvonen and Salo (2001) have investigated
the development of energy transition of finite and renewable energy resources in
an economic growth model. They find that, at an early stage, an economy gath-
ers its energy from renewable energy sources. Later, with an increasing economic
growth, it changes to a balanced demand for both renewable and non-renewable
resources whereas at the most developed stage, it decreases its share of depletable
resources. The whole process mirrors an inverted U-curve of the share of fossil
energy resources, similar to the Environmental Kuznets Curve which represents
the environmental degradation with increasing per capita income.
In this paper, we concentrate on oil as a specific representative for fossil energy
resources. On the one hand, this resource has the highest proportion in the non-
renewable energy composition for most industrial countries such as Germany or
the U.S. On the other hand, its general price setting is easily ascertainable by
taking the world reference prices into account. The limited geographic availability
of oil and oligopoly formations like OPEC have led to consistent prices by all oil-
exporters. A historical investigation of the development of oil shares shows some
common properties between groups of countries. Concerning economies which
are categorized as industrial countries and hence countries at a highly developed
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Figure 1: Oil-to-energy share of Germany and the USA
economic stage, these face a downward sloping oil-to-energy share for the past
forty years.
Figure 1 shows oil shares relative the overall energy use for two of the ma-
jor industrial countries, namely the USA and Germany. It reflects a persistent
decreasing trend in the importance of oil within the economy. Concerning the
observed period of 40 years, the U.S. economy has had an average annual decline
of about 0.26 percentage points. Other industrial countries face similar trends (see
figure 3). However, some countries underwent apparent structural breaks such as
slow-downs in the speed of decline. As in the example Germany’s decline of oil-
to-energy ratio has been temporary interrupted by the Germany reunification at
the beginning of the 1990s but went back on track again after a few years. Nev-
ertheless, all countries have experienced a significant decline in their oil-to-energy
shares, ranging from around 15% for the USA to 60% for Sweden in the long run.
Overall, the development of oil shares confirms theoretical considerations on
the composition of the overall energy mix as indicated by Tahvonen and Salo
(2001). Further, the negative trend has been stable over a longer period which
can be seen to be less affected by significant and unexpected events happening
in a short time horizon such as price pressures due to economic, political, or
natural events. Substituting oil in favor for other alternative energy resources is
not feasible instantaneously, but it is rather subject to long-term orientations due
to restructuring of large investments in e.g. infrastructure.
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4 Methodology and Data
Before analyzing the relationship between oil price fluctuation and GDP growth
and the influence of the oil-to-energy share, we give an overview of how to proceed.
At the beginning, we set up a linear vector autoregression (VAR) model similar to
Mork (1989) as a general basement for the comparison analysis.2
Next, we set up asymmetric VAR models by distinguishing between positive
and negative oil price changes to analyze but also to compare the behavior of
asymmetric effects of oil prices changes. Here, we follow three approaches provided
in the literature. First, we differentiate only between positive and negative price
changes without making any adjustments similar to Mork et al. (1994). Second,
we use the Scaled Specification Scheme by Lee et al. (1995). Third, we pick up
the Net Price Increase method by Hamilton (1996). After investigating the four
general baseline models, the moderator effects are introduced.
4.1 Symmetric Linear Model
Similar to Hamilton (1983) and Mork (1989), the variables of the baseline model
are based on the version of the six-variable system which has been set up by Sims
(1980). Despite its simplicity, it provides a good approximation of macroeconomic
activities. The VAR is a seven variable model which includes economic growth
in form of GDP growth. Robustness checks indicate a better outcome by taking
four lagged exploratory variables. Next, changes in the oil price are taken into
consideration. Further variables are added to control for macroeconomic effects
not caused by changes in the oil price. These are CPI (Consumer Price Index)
to measure inflation, interest rate, unemployment rate, IPI (Industry Producer
Index), and expenses for oil relative to GDP3. The latter is considered to take into
account the weight of dependency on oil relative to the overall economic outcome.
Consequently, a country, whose industry relies strongly on fossil energy sources is
more effected by cost fluctuations in oil prices than a country with lower shares.
The general linear baseline model is constructed as a VAR(p) model of order
p = 4. Respectively for the asymmetric approach, this model is described of the
reduced form
2In fact, Mork (1989) uses a seemingly unrelated regression framework which is a special form
of a VAR-model with the restriction to allow for correlation between the error terms of each time
series. Due to the more complex structure, we use general VAR.
3See the appendix for a detailed description.
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yt = c+
4∑
j=1
αjyt−j + εt (1)
where c is the (7x1) interception vector, αj is the j
th (7x7) matrix of autoregres-
sive coefficients and yt is a (7x1) vector of endogenous variables described below.
εt describes the error term of the equation.
Opposite to Hamilton (1983), we use the interest rate representing the financial
sector by the monetary channel through adjustments of the interest rate instead
of the control of money supply (M1). For most of the countries, we take the
short term interest rate. This complies with the current literature. As a proxy for
domestic prices and the inflation rate, we add the CPI. We consider the IPI as an
approximation for economic development outside the country. Positive effects on
the growth rate can result from an increase in the net export rate which might have
its origin abroad. Hence, this variable is included to measure exogenous export
demand. In this regard, it is the industrial production index for the G7 countries4
which covers the main trade parters of most countries. The original models by
Sims (1980), Hamilton (1983), and Mork (1989) use import prices whereas Mork
et al. (1994) show that this index represents foreign business cycles more properly
and that the coefficients of both do not differ significantly. For further definitions
and descriptions of the variables see the appendix.
Using an orthogonalized system aims to avoid that error terms are correlated to
each other in the IRFs. By triangularizing the reduced VAR, we get orthogonaliza-
tion of the residuals which also yield to a recursive structure. This process is also
known as using Cholesky decomposition in the reduced VAR as suggested by Sims
(1980). Along with triangularization, the order of the endogenous variables be-
comes important as it determines the restriction of influence of the variables. The
first predicted variable is determined by all lagged regressors whereas the second
variable is furthermore contemporaneously affected by the current first variable,
and so on. In this model, we use the order: GDP growth, oil price changes, changes
in CPI, interest rate, unemployment rate, IPI, and oil-to-GDP ratio. By setting
the order of the first three variables, we assume that oil-prices do not contem-
poraneously affect GDP but inflation. This is in line with the literature as oil
price settings are often ascribed to have a certain degree of exogenous behavior,
dissociated from general price developments. Ordering interest rate as the forth
variable implies that the former values react with a clear lag, similar as the IPI
and oil-to-GDP ratio.
4This measurement includes the G7 countries until 2015: Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, UK, USA
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4.2 Asymmetric Nonlinear Model
We extend our analysis by applying a non-linear approach through the estimation
of three different methods of price determination. The i) asymmetric approach,
the ii) scaled specification approach, and the iii) net oil price increase approach .
All three specifications only differ in the determination of the oil price, hence, the
overall model structure including the growth rates along with the control variables
does not change. This allows to compare symmetric with asymmetric as well
as non-linear models to examine different properties of the behavior of oil price
changes on economic growth.
The asymmetric approach by Mork (1989) distinguishes between positive and
negative oil price changes. Consequently, the oil price variable is split up into two
parts with no further modification in level values.
∆oil+ =
{
∆oil if ∆oil > 0
0 otherwise
∆oil− =
{
∆oil if ∆oil < 0
0 otherwise
The scaled oil price increase (SOPI) approach by Lee et al. (1995) follows price
normalization with regard to its variability using an autoregressive process. The
model is based on a GARCH structure which includes a four lagged autoregressive
process with a one lagged AR process of its variance.
∆oilt = α0 +
4∑
i=1
βi∆oilt−i + t, t | It−1 ∼ N(0, ht)
ht = γ0 + γ1
2
t−1 + γ2ht−1
SOPIt = max(0, ˆt/
√
hˆt)
SOPDt = min(0, ˆt/
√
hˆt)
where information about t is contained in information set It−1. This AR(4)-
GARCH(1,1) specification follows Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) and the
approach by Lee et al. (1995), but has also been verified by sensitivity analysis in
our case. The final scaled oil price is determined by the expected error of the AR
change in oil price formation and the expected standard error of its variance. From
intuition, this means that during both a period of stable prices changes as well as
a period of high volatility the scaled price change is fluctuating less compared to
the case in which a smooth period is followed by a sudden peak in price changes.
Hence, the impact of shocks contributes stronger than a continuous trend. In
addition to the initial proportion by Hamilton (1996), we also observe the model
with scaled oil price decreases (SOPD).
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The net oil price increase (NOPI) approach has been proposed by Hamilton
(1996), including an AR(4) process of oil prices in levels. It only permits the
current oil price to change and to have an impact on the economy if it exceeds
the highest price from the previous four periods. Otherwise, the NOPI value is
assigned to be zero. Consequently, the change in oil prices reflected by NOPI is
not equal to a quarterly oil price change.
NOPIt = max(0, 100 ∗ {ln(oilt)− ln[max(oilt−j)]}) , j = 1, 2, 3, 4
4.3 Oil Share as Moderator
Next to investigating the effect of oil price changes on GDP growth, we are further
interested in whether this effect is different when the economy is faced with various
oil-to-energy shares. All four baseline models are extended to allow for the inves-
tigation of the role of oil and energy shares within the aggregated economy. To
do that, we make use of a moderated regression analysis in form of an Interacted
VAR (IVAR) which is an otherwise VAR model but in which an interaction term
substitutes the original price predictor. The interaction term is determined by the
variable which will be shocked and the conditional variable. In theory, this term
measures a moderation effect that affects the strength of the relation between
a predictor variable and a criterion variable. If there is significant relationship
of the predictor variable on the dependent variable, moderation is supported. In
that case, we find evidence that the moderator influences the effect of the indepen-
dent and dependent variable, either by amplifying or weakening the relationship
between both.
IVAR have been recently introduced in several studies to analyze the impact
of structural characteristics on the response of other variables to a macroeconomic
shock. Towbin and Weber (2013) investigate the transmission of an external shock
on output and investments with the influence of varying foreign currency debt, raw
materials and exchange rate regimes. Lucotte and Leroy (2017) study the effect
of competition in the financial sector on credit procyclicality. Caggiano et al.
(2015) use a IVAR to examine the role of uncertainty at the zero lower bond by
fully endogeneizing the conditioning variables. The current study is based on the
Interacted Panel VAR by Towbin and Weber (2013).5
Respectively for each oil price determination approach, the recursive form of
the IVAR is described by
5We thank Towbin and Weber for providing their MATLAB codes of the toolbox for Interacted
Panel VAR estimations (based on Towbin and Weber (2011)).
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
1 0 . . . 0
α2,10,t 1 . . . 0
... α3,20,t
. . .
...
α7,10,t . . . α
7,6
0,t 1
 yt = γc+
4∑
j=1

α1,1j,t α
1,2
j,t . . . α
1,7
j,t
α2,1j,t α
2,2
j,t . . . α
2,7
j,t
... α3,2j,t
. . . α3,7j,t
α7,1j,t . . . α
7,6
j,t α
7,7
j,t
 yt−j + εt εt ∼ N(0,Σ) (2)
where the impact matrix on the left hand side is a lower triangular matrix. The
error terms are, by construction, uncorrelated across equations and orthogonalized
to each other with a diagonal covariance matrix Σ. This has the advantage that the
full system can be solved sequentially using OLS. As we use the same identification
scheme as before, the variables remain in the same order. c is the intercept and εt
describes the error term of the equation.
The baseline VAR-models from the previous section include endogenous vari-
ables only which react to each other respectively. In contrast to that, variables
describing a structural condition are assumed to be exogenous given and inde-
pendent on the remaining variables in the IVAR model. This is reasonable in
the short term horizon since a direct reaction of the oil-to-energy share includes
changes of structural infrastructure and other investments whose implications have
effects in the long run. Observing the historical development oil-to-energy shares
whose speed of change has been slow, supports this assumption. Furthermore, the
coefficients in this model are allowed to vary with theses deterministic structural
characteristics. In other words, the autoregressive αw,qj,t coefficients are functions
of the cross-time-varying level of oil-to-energy shares:
αw,qj,t = β
w,q
j + η
w,q
j,1 · st + ηw,qj,2 · s2t (3)
where βw,qj,t and η
w,q
j,1 are vectors of coefficients and st is the oil-to-energy share. The
dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to the oil-price shock are condition-
ally linear. However, only oil price are restricted to interact with the oil-to-energy
share: For all remaining αw,qj,t coefficients
αw,qj,t = β
w,q
j,t for all but q = 2
holds6.
After estimating the IVAR, a structural analysis is conducted based on varying
structural characteristics to measure the consequences of a high and low oil-to-
energy share. More detailed, we observe the effect of oil-price changes on GDP
growth for the individual 30th and 70th percentiles of the oil-to-energy share for
each country.
To verify robustness of our results, we analyze the order of integration using a
unit root test (see table 1). According to the Dickey-Fuller test, stationarity has
6Assuming that equation (4) holds for all q, we have the baseline model.
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been confirmed for GDP, CPI, IPI, interest rate, unemployment rate, and oil-prices
in their first log-differences. For all further variables (oil-to-GDP share and oil-to-
energy share7) level-values are used 8 We choose the number of lags in the VAR
based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) according to the sensitivity analysis. Along with that, we use
lagged values of four quarters of a year for each variable to be able to consider
variations which appear over a year. For GDP and the oil price defining variables
including its interaction term with oil shares, we also consider the current values.
From a balanced panel dataset, the sample period of all models covers 172
quarters, a time period from 1971:I to 2013:IV for 12 different countries, namely
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. As a result, it covers the oil crises in
1979/80 as well as the oil price increase in the 2000s and in part the sharp de-
crease in 2012 onwards. Results from a seemingly unrelated regression as a model
framework similar to Mork (1989) and Mork et al. (1994) do not essentially deviate
from our finding in the VAR-model9.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we will analyze the linear model as well as the three asymmetric
approaches. Hereby, the study of moderator effects of oil shares will be done
separately from the general analysis of oil prices in the macroeconomic context.
This will ease the analysis by clearly distinguishing between the general study as
it has been done by previous researches e.g. Hamilton (1983) or more recently
Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005), and the extended part which focuses on a
new feature in the relationship between oil prices and economic growth. Moreover,
7According to Wagner and Hong (2016), there is no definite answer in econometric literature
to deal with the concept of integrated and cointegrated processes to the nonlinear environment
as it takes place in the oil-to-GDP ratio. As a minimum requirement for a useful extension of
this concept they suggested to exclude cointegration, which is why we use level-values.
8For interest rate and unemployment rate, the Dickey-Fuller test indicates stationarity only
for a few level values. However, the majority of literature Mork (1989); Mork et al. (1994);
Hooker (1996); Lee et al. (1995); Hamilton (1996) estimates its models with level values. To
make our results more comparable to the literature, we have performed two analysis: one with
level values and one with first difference values for interest and unemployment rate (as it is done
by Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005)). Despite of these differences in control variables,
the relevant results for the analysis of the moderator effect are largely robust and do not vary
significantly. Hence, we stick to the results based on our dataset by using first difference values.
9A SUR is a special form of a VAR-model with the restriction that the error terms of each
time series are correlated with each other. This allows us to deal with white noise that can affect
all local economies commonly which is assumed to be included in all error terms. As a side effect,
the amount of estimates are increased compared the a general VAR-model.
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compared to other studies, we will put more focus on Granger causality between
oil prices, energy shares, and aggregate growth, to find evidence for the possible
role of oil shares emitting moderator effects.
After classifying countries into groups of oil-consuming and oil-producing coun-
tries, we look at the models’ relative explanatory power using the information cri-
terion. Subsequently, casual relation as well as quantitative influence of oil prices
on economic growth are investigated. In the first instance, this is done for the
general models followed by their modified versions. For the sake of simplicity, we
identify an oil price shock as a positive change in the oil price. Correspondingly,
a negative price movement will be called a negative price shock.
5.1 Classification of Oil-Importing vs. Oil-Exporting Coun-
try
When classifying the countries into two different groups, we distinguish between
oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. A country is regarded to be an oil-
exporter when having a production-consumption ratio of larger than one (see figure
2). According to this definition, three out of twelve countries investigated in this
study are categorized as oil producing countries. Norway has constantly been an
oil-exporting country, with an oil production exceeding consumption ten times in
2014. Canada made the transformation to a pure oil-exporting country in 1980.
Since then, the average ratio has amounted to 1.5. The UK has switched from
being an oil-exporting to being an oil-importing country in 2005, with a peak in
the productions-consumption ratio at 1.6. However, as the UK is classified as a
net-oil-exporter during three quarters of the observed time series, we do consider
the UK as an oil-exporting country. The remaining nine countries are classified as
oil-importing countries. However, their dependency on oil imports varies largely,
from 0.03 for Japan to 0.75 for the US in 201410.
5.2 Model Selection
Since the four models are non-nested, we cannot use the likelihood-ratio test to
make a statement about the quality of the models in comparison to each other.
Therefore, we mainly refer to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) which impose no restrictions like these. Both criteria
measure the goodness of fit of one model compared to another model. Hence, they
do not make any proposal regarding the general quality of a individual model, but
rather weight the explanatory power relative to that of other models. According to
10Due to new exhausting technologies, the US could increase their production share from 0.4
to 0.75 between 2007 and 2014, and is still showing a further increasing trend.
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Burnham and Anderson (2004), the AIC has theoretical advantages compared to
the BIC. Among others, the amount of parameters are penalized less strongly using
the AIC than using the BIC. Additionally, and particularly in the case at hand, the
results might be altered due to the high number of parameters in our models setup.
However, considering differences between the standard and extended setups, the
results do not vary strongly.
Table 2 shows the results for the baseline models. We investigate both, the
AIC and BIC. The results are consistent for all countries. Concerning the stan-
dard setup, the NOPI model and the asymmetric linear model, considering price
increases only, provide similar results, whereas the former performs slightly better.
They are both preferred over the symmetric linear approach. However, all specifi-
cations are strictly dominated by the scaled approach considering price increases
only. This is in line with other studies such as Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez
(2005) or Hamilton (1996) who tend to prefer the SOPI approach. Nonetheless,
the results also reflect that all information criteria of these four approaches are on
a similar level within each country in our estimations. However, it is notable that
in case of Norway, the information criteria are considerable larger which can lead
to an overestimation.
Concerning the relative performance of the models, graphical results of respec-
tive impulse response functions confirm similar classification (see figures 4-9). The
graphs show the impact of oil price changes on GDP growth without modera-
tor effects. Comparing the confidence bands, we can figure out the precision of
estimation with respect to each other.
Altogether, it has to be assumed from these results that besides choosing be-
tween using a symmetric and a non-symmetric model structure, the environment
of a model, together with its advantages and disadvantages, has also to be consid-
ered. This is even more important when dealing with the special structure when
including moderator effects of oil-to-energy shares. Furthermore, a modeled en-
vironment, which considers country specific properties and additional properties
such as asymmetry and non-linearity, are valued higher regarding the consequences
for GDP growth than in the simple linear-symmetric approaches.
5.3 Granger Causality and Response to Price Shock
Before analyzing the influence of changes in oil prices on aggregated economic
growth and the relationship between the two qualitatively and quantitatively, we
investigate the causal relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth.
Hereby, we distinguish between direct and indirect causality, resulting from oil
price changes. At first, we carry out a conventional F-test for each model sepa-
rately. To be more precise, we investigate whether Granger-causality of oil prices
on economic growth is significant by performing a Wald test. According to the
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latter, we test the null-hypothesis whether all oil price coefficients of each country
are jointly zero. For the asymmetric models, these tests are performed individually
for positive and negative changes. The results are shown in table 3. In the follow-
ing, we assume confirmation of a causal relationship at a 10% significance level.
By considering indirect causality from oil price changes to GDP growth by third
variables, we are able to identify possible channels which are beyond the direct
oil-price to GDP growth relationship. We use a structural VAR model, imposing
a few constraints, to test whether all oil price coefficient are jointly zero, but in its
own equation. The results are summarized in table 5.
Subsequent to the causality test, we analyze the qualitative and quantitative
impact of an oil price shock by considering its effects on GDP growth. Table 6
comprises the accumulated price effect for each model in period 4 to 12 after the
shock. In addition, the results are prepared graphically as orthogonalized impulse
response functions in graphs 4-9, looking at a time horizon of 20 periods. The size
of a shock is the same for all models (100% increase/decrease in oil price) whereas
this one-time shock occurs unexpectedly.
5.3.1 Oil-Importing Countries
Considering a positive oil price shock shows an inconsistent economic response
among the oil importing countries with respect to Granger causality. Under the
assumption of symmetry, a change in oil prices is significantly Granger causing
economic growth through the direct channel in only three out of nine oil importing
countries, namely Belgium, Germany, and Japan. However, the indirect channel
through a third variable takes a more important role, being highly significant for all
countries except Canada11. Regarding the GDP growth responds after an oil price
shock, the majority of countries have a similar development in their responses.
A direct increase in GDP growth is followed by a drop in its growth rate which
fades out after a few quarters (figure 4). In contrast to that, Japan’s economy is
faced by several fluctuations in GDP growth which neutralize each other. These
developments are also visible in the accumulated responses of the price shock. In
total, all oil-importing countries face a negative impact whereas it is significantly
weaker in Japan, accounting for -0.9% after two years (-3.8% for Finland, -2.9 for
the USA, and -2.1% for France) (see table 6). Although Sweden’s economy is also
negatively affected in the second year after the price increase, these effects are
offset by its initial positive response.
In the asymmetric framework, the results of the linear-asymmetric, scaled-,
and net-price models are qualitative equal, at least for oil price increases (see
11In contrast to other literature such as Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005), we could not
find a significant indirect causal effect in all five models (for both positive and negative price
change) for Canada.
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figure 5, 7, and 9). Similar to the symmetric approach, all countries experience
negative accumulated impacts on GDP growth after two years. But in contrast
to the symmetric approach, also Sweden and Japan are faced by clear negative
effects from the second year onwards. The non-European countries Australia,
Japan, the USA experience immediate drops in GDP growth which are delayed by
a few quarters for the remaining oil-importing countries. Overall, this is consistent
with regard to their oil dependency. However, (direct) Granger-causality cannot
be confirmed for all countries. Similar to the linear symmetric approach, only
a few countries have Granger causality from oil-price changes to GDP growth
directly. Alone Belgium and Germany show significant results throughout the
three approaches, the Netherlands lacks in significance in the scaled price approach,
whereas Japan and the USA have significant results in the scaled price approach
only. In contrast to that, indirect influence of changes in oil-prices on GDP growth
though at least one of the remaining aggregated macroeconomic indicators are
mostly valid for all countries except for Canada.
Regarding the magnitudes, the countries differ partially depending on the
model selection. It is noticeable that the USA and Japan face the highest im-
pacts on GDP growth. Especially for Japan, these strong consequences are not
surprising since it has had by far the highest dependency on oil imports of above
96%. For the USA, it can be justify that the U.S. economy has been faced by real
exchange rate appreciation which has been pointed out by Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and
Sa´nchez (2005). In other words, as oil is traded in US dollars on the world market,
the USA cannot counteract changes in oil prices by adjusting their currency, in
contrast to other countries. On average, the linear asymmetric approach gener-
ates lower magnitudes while the scaled approach has slightly larger results than
the NOPI model. Moreover, the asymmetric models generate higher magnitudes
than the symmetric approach. Both is in line with former studies. Although the
price shock is qualitatively the same within all models, its effect is enhanced in the
net price and above all in the scaled model as both approaches act more sensible
to previous price trends. For example, Germany is faced by an accumulated GDP
growth loss of 1.3% in the symmetric approach, 2.5% in the asymmetric linear
approach, 3.7% in the NOPI model, and 4.6% in the scaled price approach.
Observing negative oil price movements, the results contradict with the vast
literature which mainly reject any relationship with GDP growth. From the F-
test, analyzing the direct influence of oil-price changes on GDP growth, we can
find significant effects for Finland (not SOPD), France, Japan, and Sweden (not
SOPD). However, indirect channels can be even highly identified for all countries.
Each of them experiences positive response in GDP growth rates after price in-
creases which turns to become negative as of the second year until it fades out in
the subsequent years. The size of the magnitude seems to be inconsistent, leading
19
to clearly positive accumulated results for Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the
USA but negative results for Belgium, Finland, and France in both negative price
approaches. Only Japan and the Netherlands have inconsistent accumulated ef-
fects, being negative in the linear-asymmetric approach and positive in the scaled
model. The accumulated negative response for some countries ranging from -0.4%
for Japan up to -4.4% for Finland in the linear approach contradicts with the as-
sumption that an economy profits from lower costs on the demand side of economic
players. A possible explanation for this unusual effect is that the few sharp oil price
decreases have taken place along with low economic growth rates (in the 1980s)
up to a recession (2008). Consequently, the countries have been confronted with
them at a time period where the domestic economy has been more vulnerable to
economic downturns which has had stronger negative effects overall. According to
the accumulated IRFs, it is worth to mention that the respective reaction of GDP
growth rates after price drops is not as strong as in the case of a positive oil price
shock. With the exception of Sweden in the linear model and Belgium in both
models, all remaining countries are faced with a lower accumulated magnitude,
which is confirmed by the IRF figures (see figure 6 and 8).
To conclude, the results after positive shocks on oil prices are in compliance
with the literature, saying that overall, countries’ GDP growth reacts negatively.
However, in contrast to previous studies, decreasing oil prices have significant
effects on GDP growth as we have seen for a few countries. Moreover, as the
more preferred scaled oil price model (followed by the net price approach) has
higher magnitudes in its price coefficients, it seems that the consequences of an oil
price shock on economic growth are larger in a volatile economy than in a stable
one. This finding prevails throughout this study. It confirms the assumption that
economic uncertainty or unexpected sharp price changes which are intensified in
the non-linear approaches, induce higher pressure on the economy.
5.3.2 Oil-Exporting Countries
For oil-exporting countries, the F-test mirrors the results of the oil-importing coun-
tries, namely that there is almost no support for a direct causal effect from oil-
price movements to GDP growth, with exception for UK (in NOPI only). Only
for Canada, we find some effects but they are limited to oil-price decreases. How-
ever, as seen before, the main influence by oil-price changes takes place in indirect
channels which also holds for the UK and Norway. Alone for Canada, we cannot
confirm any significant indirect causal effect which can be led back to oil price
changes, only. Qualitatively, the UK and Norway are similarly affected by oil
price shocks facing a positive response in GDP growth in the first periods which
becomes negative afterwards. Overall, the accumulated price effects are negative
after three years as the initial positive development is preponderated by the nega-
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tive response. Only in the symmetric and scaled price approaches, Norway deviates
by experiencing positive accumulated pressure on GDP growth. At first glance the
adverse effects seem to be unexpected since the oil extracting sector is generally
profiting from higher prices. But Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) find the
same results for the UK linking it to the exchange rate appreciation which has
been a side effect of oil price hikes. In our model, the effective exchange rate is not
used as a separate variable but integrated in the country’s specific oil price. Fur-
thermore, Canada in its 1970s and the UK since 2008 are oil-demanding countries.
As such, it is not surprising to find a resembling response as in the oil-importing
countries analyzed in the previous section. Considering the magnitude of IRFs, the
largest accumulated effects after an oil price shock is in the British economy. In the
linear-asymmetric approach, a 100% increase in oil prices leads to an accumulated
reduction of economic growth of 2.3% for UK whereas the decrease in growth of
Norway values only 1.6%. This trend continues in the other price structures as
well.
5.4 Granger Causality with Moderator Effects
The modified version of the models includes interaction effects of changes in oil
prices and the quarterly moving average oil-to-energy share to involve a possible
moderator in the explanation of economic growth. Hence, the F-test checking
for Granger causality is adjusted by the hypothesis whether all moderator coeffi-
cients are jointly zero. A significant result is an indication for an impact of the
oil-to-energy share on the oil-price impact on economic growth. The results are
summarized in table 4. As in the baseline model, we will consider the accumu-
lated effect of price changes as well as its development over the periods in an IRF
graph. The structural characteristic in the interaction term which is represented
by the oil-to-energy share, is kept constant and enters the model exogenously.
Concerning the accumulated effect, we take the 50th percentile of each individual
countries’ oil-to-energy share. This yields to an approximate average of the oil-to-
energy development over the investigated time period. For the non-accumulated
orthogonalized IRF analysis, we further calculated the respective results for the
30th and 70th percentile as depicted in the graphs 10 - 15. This allows us to gain
information of how the relationship between variation in oil prices and economic
growth distinguish when the economy is faced with various energy shares. Again,
we look at oil-importing and oil-exporting countries separately. In doing so, we
will first discuss the causal relation of oil price changes to GDP growth, followed
by investigating the price effects including the moderator variable stemming from
the changes in the oil-to-energy share.
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5.4.1 Oil-Importing Countries
Through a F-test, it is investigated whether the inclusion of oil-to-energy shares
as moderator variables is significant and hence whether they improve the model.
Table 4 shows the corresponding results for all countries. We find evidence for
Granger causality of the interaction coefficients with GDP growth and according to
that the existence of moderator effects. For the majority of oil-importing countries,
the causality can be confirmed at the 1% significance level. Alternatively, we also
check for a linear function to determine the oil-price coefficients to allow for a
linearity in the moderation effect. However, for most of the countries, there is a
lack of significance which concludes that non-linearity is an essential assumption
by describing the intensification effect of oil-price changes. In sum, the extension
of standard oil-price - GDP models by adding the behavior of oil-to-energy share
but also its non-linear interaction with oil-prices over time lead to an improvement
in estimation results. Considering the linear price approaches, it is striking that all
importing countries experience similar responses in GDP growth after a positive
oil price shock. With exception of Germany and the USA, the initial reaction is
an increase in growth, followed by up-and-down movements which slowly fade out.
The accumulated responses of GDP growth are presented in table 7, with
fixed structural characteristics in the interaction terms amounting for the 50th
percentile. In the linear approaches which are less valued according to the IC
criteria, all countries are negatively affected by price shocks from the second year
onwards with the exception of Australia and the Netherlands in the symmetric
model, and Belgium and France in the asymmetric model. Surprisingly, we find
a positive response of GDP growth for Japan in all models which contradicts
the results from the baseline model. Compared to the other countries, it further
seems that the positive pure price effects are persistent at higher levels (1.2% in
the symmetric approach and 4.4% in the asymmetric approach). These unusual
outcomes for Japan have already been discussed in previous papers (Mork et al.
(1994); Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005)). In their studies, economic growth
in Japan was positively affected by oil price increases which has been explained
with a more resilient Japanese economy. The country overcame the second oil price
crisis after 1980 much better than the first crisis (73-74), in particular compared
with other oil importing countries. As Japan could not benefit significantly from
oil price drops in the 1980s, the resilient effect is even amplified in our symmetric
model. But unlike Mork et al. and Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez, this finding
can also be obtained from our model. The inclusion of oil-to-energy shares could be
the reason why this outcome cannot be found in the baseline model. According to
the results, the higher resistance to oil price shocks has existed especially in periods
with higher dependency on oil for example the 1970s. At that time ratios have
been far above the shares of remaining oil-importing countries excluding Sweden.
22
Comparing these results to those with low oil-to-energy shares, their accumulated
responses of GDP growth have declined or rather become negative. Hence, as the
response of GDP growth has become worse in the subsequent years and the role of
oil within in economy has lost in value it can be concluded that resistance could
not be maintained by Japan over the time.
In the non-linear models, the response patterns of GDP growth are very similar.
For one thing, the SOPI acts as an amplified version of the NOPI as the qualitative
magnitudes of response in the IRF graphs for each country respectively are very
similar (compare figures 13 and 15). The negative responses are also confirmed
by the accumulated output as the qualitative results are mainly equal. Only for
Belgium and France, we find positive results in the scaled approach but in both
cases, the accumulated effects are negligible. But then, among each other, the
countries vary widely. As a early reaction GDP growth undergoes negative pres-
sure in Australia, Finland, the Netherlands and the USA, which turns to become
positive with the times. Common features in this group can be constituted in
a significant lower dependency in oil-imports, except for Finland. However, the
latter does not recover notably as the remaining countries. Contrary to that, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Japan, and Sweden initially react positively but undergo
negative pressure in GDP growth from the second year which offsets the previous
gains. Hence, these economies have a delay in facing the concrete consequences
which follow from an oil price shock.
The response of GDP growth to negative oil price is similar to the results from
the respective baseline models. All oil-importing countries experience positive
effects except Belgium, Finland and France. Again, this is argued with the timing
of negative price changes and the state of the economy at that time. Only for the
USA, we find diverging qualitative outcomes as their accumulated growth rates
become negative (1.3% in the linear approach, 3.1% in the scaled approach). This
is in line with Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) whereas the author cannot
confirm it for the scaled approach. It should be noted that when lowering its
oil-to-energy share, the U.S. economy’s positive and negative responses neutralize
each other which results in a similar result to Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez.
Additionally, the 30th and 70th percentile are calculated to study the response
of an economy to various oil-to energy share. The results are enclosed in the IRF
graphs and can be gathered from figure 10 - 15. We can point out two trends which
go along with high or low oil-to-energy shares. Firstly, an oil-importing country
experiences more negative pressure on its GDP growth when it has a higher oil-
to-energy ratio. Intuitively, this makes sense as the spendings for its oil-imports
increase. However, this also means that the share indeed amplifies the effect of oil
price changes on economic growth. Secondly, there are more fluctuation in GDP
growth, the higher the oil-to-energy share. This result is in line with the theoretical
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assumption saying that a higher dependency on imports of fossil energy resources
such as oil makes a country more vulnerable to price variations. All countries have
in common that they are faced with a prevailingly declining oil-to-energy share
over the whole observed time series. Along with our results, it can be concluded
that the declining moderator weakens the effect of oil prices on economic growth.
However, the graphical results also show that countries do not respond equally
to adjustments in the oil-to-energy ratio. All countries would improve in their
GDP response in case of an oil-price shock by lowering their oil-dependency. But
Australia and Belgium would hardly experience any changes while Finland, France,
the Netherlands, and Sweden would be faced with dramatic drops in GDP growth.
This can be probably led back to the potential by which a country can change
its oil-to-energy ratio but also its development the country has taken so far. For
the latter group, the shares have varied between 30 (France) up to 60 percentage
points (Sweden). As we set the structural characteristic according the countries’
individually development, this makes it hard to directly compare them quantita-
tively.
To conclude, the decline of oil-to-energy share has had a contribution to the
lower degree of reaction of GDP growth to oil price fluctuations. Due to lower
(negative) effects the consequences of uncertainty about the short-term develop-
ment of price changes have also improved. As in the baseline model, oil price
increases have a larger magnitude in the response of GDP growth than oil price
decreases whereas the latter do not always reflect the mirror image of price in-
creases. According to that, asymmetric frameworks still outperform symmetric
ones. Subsequently, it can be supposed that the change in the energy mix can also
be seen as a possible contributor which has led to a changed the causality of oil
prices to GDP growth.
5.4.2 Oil-Exporting Countries
Results of a F-test to check for the significance of the interaction terms within the
functions determining the price coefficients are summarized in table 4. For Canada
and the UK, the moderator effect from oil-to-energy share is consistent and highly
significant in all four price models. For Norway, the existence is slightly weaker
but still confirmed at the 10% significance level.
Qualitatively, the response of GDP growth to a positive oil price shock does
not distinguish from the baseline model excluding Norway. The results give an
uniform picture within all countries which are mainly suffering from in increase
in prices, even for Norway. Aggregated economic growth reacts instantaneously
negative whereas Canada’s economy response with a short time lag. Overall, the
inclusion of the interaction term seems to improve the model by making the re-
sults more consistent. However, for an oil-exporting country, the negative response
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might be surprising as theoretically, the terms of trade profit from higher prices
which can be taken on exports. However, Canada and the UK share a similarity
concerning their import-export ratio of oil. In 1980, Canada has switched from
a previously/former oil importing country to an oil exporting country. Hence,
it has been an importer in most of the oil crisis which makes it hard to classify
the effects based on our observations. Moreover, Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez
(2005) point out an exchange rate appreciation in the Canadian economy after oil
price increases which can justify the negative reaction of GDP growth after 1982
despite of exporting crude oil. The UK has experienced the opposite transforma-
tion in the 2000s and therefore shares similar structural properties of oil importing
countries for a much longer period, including positive and negative shocks in the
1970s and 1980s. In contrast to that, Norway has constantly been an oil-exporting
country where extraction of oil exceeds the own consumption many times over.
The unusual response for Norway can be explained with an appreciation of the
exchange rate, similar to Canada but also with the development of its oil-to-GDP
share over the observed time. In contrast to all other countries, Norway has not
experienced a steady decrease in its ratio but achieved its bottom of around 30%
in early 2000s. Afterwards, the share has increased significantly by more than 13
percentage points. The subsequent phase of oil price increases has taken place
simultaneously with low aggregate growth rates due to world recession in 2008.
As we calculate the accumulated effects of positive oil price shocks taking the
50th percentile, the results might give a distortionary picture of the true effects.
Accordingly, we consider the varying responses by taking different structural char-
acteristics into account.
In case of various oil-to-energy ratios, Canada’s and the UK’s response deviates
significantly from Norway. Comparing the 50th and 70th percentile, higher shares
along with oil price shocks do not only impair their economic growth with larger
magnitudes but also increase the volatility of growth notably. The last reaction
particularly applies to Canada. By contrast, Norway’s economy is more resilient
to changes in its oil-to-energy ratio.
The response of negative price shocks on GDP growth is similar as in the base-
line model although taking the country’s specific oil-to-energy ratio into account.
As we can confirm moderation effects, accumulated growth reacts positively in
Canada and Norway whereas the UK suffers from sharp oil-price declines. How-
ever, by analyzing the development of the response, Canada’s economy is less
robust to price drops compared with Norway which leads to greater negative re-
sponses in later periods which even offset the earlier gains in the scaled approach.
This contradicts with Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) who found reverse
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results for Canada and no significant outcome for Norway12. As it can be seen
from IRF figures 12 and 14, this response is intensified by considering higher oil-
to-energy shares. For Canada, they generate larger magnitudes especially in the
negative range, along with variability which has also increased.
To conclude, the three oil-exporting countries distinguish considerably more
than oil-importing countries regarding their response to price changes when tak-
ing oil-to-energy shares into account. Overall, accumulated negative effects of oil
prices increases from the baseline model are confirmed for all countries but the
development and dimension of those are different. This is partly because of the
historical development in oil-to-energy shares but also the structural alteration
of the economies, either towards a pure oil-exporting economy (Canada) or an
economy with mainly oil-imports (the UK). Consequently, this group of countries
has to be treated more sensitively especially when doing comparisons. Concerning
the magnitudes after price increases and decreases, we can confirm the previous
findings for oil-importing countries, namely that the latter has a lower effect on
aggregated growth.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of oil price movements on GDP growth considering
four different models of price determination. It shows that oil consuming countries
are negatively affected by positive oil price shocks. These results are consistent
with the literature. Even by enlarging the sample size by adding new countries to
the model and extending the time horizon to 2014, the results prevail. Moreover,
we could/can confirm the exclusion of symmetry in the relationship of oil prices
and GDP as it has been assumed since the 1980s. However, in contrast to previous
studies, the role of decreasing oil prices should not be ignored as we have seen for
a few countries. Most strikingly, the paper analyzes the existence of moderator
effects caused by a decline in the oil-to-energy share which weakens the causal
effect of oil prices on economic growth. In all twelve countries, this moderator
is highly significant. We find that oil price increases have a lower effect on GDP
growth the lower the oil-to-energy ratio. Hereby, oil-importing countries clearly
profit from a decreasing oil-to-energy share whereas oil-exporting countries show
a more variable behavior. Furthermore, it could be pointed out that fluctuation
in the response of GDP growth is significantly weaken along with lower oil shares.
This result is in line with the theoretical assumption that a higher dependency
on imports of fossil energy resources such as oil makes a country more vulnerable
12In there study looking at multivariate correlation between GDP growth and oil-price de-
creases, Mork et al. (1994) confirm a positive result for Canada and negative outcome for the
UK using the same variables.
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to price variations. Since all countries are facing declining oil-to-energy ratios,
it helps to explain why direct consequences of fluctuations in oil prices on GDP
growth have decreased during the past 40 years.
Since this paper only investigates aggregated macroeconomic activities, het-
erogeneous and detailed changes within the economy such as on the more detailed
sector-level are not considered. Hence, it is probably worthwhile to take a deeper
look to sectoral or even firm specific variables to allow for dissimilar developments
of energy consumption. A broader analysis helps to control for diverse progress
on the micro-level which are contingently offset on the macro-level and therefore
not visible in our study. Additional insides from refined models are remained on
the agenda for further research. Another theory which has not be regarded within
this paper is worth to mention. A low oil-to-energy share can also mean to have a
relative advantage within alternative resources and/or technologies. In situations
when oil prices are upward moving, this advantage can lead to an increasing de-
mand from countries which are suffering more from higher prices. This additional
stimulus can offset higher costs for fossil energy resources.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Definition of Variables
• ∆ GDP growth: Variable describes the quarterly growth of Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP, using expenditure approach) of a country compared to
the previous quarter. The data is seasonally adjusted and measured in per-
centage terms.
Source: OECD - Subject B1 GE
• CPI: Variable describes quarterly Relative consumer price indices of a coun-
try. It is seasonally adjusted and indexed with the base year 2010=100
Source: OECD - Subject CCRETT01
• interest rate: The variable describes the quarterly short-term interest rates
of a country per annum based on 3-months.
Source: OECD - Subject IR3TIB
• unemployment rate: The variable describes the quarterly Harmonised
unemployment rate. It represents the number of unemployed persons as a
percentage of the labor force.
Source: OECD - Subject LRHUTTTT
• IPI: The variable describes the quarterly Industry Producer Index of the
OECD area totally. It is indexed with the base year 2010=100
Source: OECD - Subject INDPROD
• oil demand relative to GDP: The variable describes all net oil imports
relative to GDP.
Source: OECD - Subject OILIMPGDPPPP and TPESGDPPPP
• PPI: The variable describes quarterly total producer prices compared to the
previous quarter.
Source: OECD - Subject PIEAMP01
• ∆ oil price: The variable describes averaged quarterly growth of oil prices
of a country compared to the previous quarter. Nominal costs of OPEC
countries crude oil are adjusted by PPI.
Source: EIA - FOB Costs of OPEC Countries Crude Oil
• oil-to-energy share: The share is measured by the ratio of total oil supply
and total primary energy supply which sums up production and imports of
energy substracted by exports and storage changes. It is calculated as the
moving average of current the previous three quarters.
Source: IEA - Subject TPES and OILTPES
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Table 1: Unit root test
cons & trend constant trend cons & trend constant trend
GDP ∆ GDP
AUS -0.892 4.743 14.412 -13.517 -13.557 -8.766
BEL -0.960 1.090 10.882 -8.586 -8.376 -6.370
CAN -1.219 -0.756 4.546 -8.926 -8.658 -6.000
FIN -1.219 -0.756 4.546 -14.157 -13.835 -11.735
FRA -0.792 -1.183 10.799 -8.433 -7.821 -5.276
GBR -1.563 0.587 8.005 -10.807 -10.789 -8.605
GER -2.111 -0.726 5.844 -11.989 -11.733 -9.651
JPN -0.453 -2.310 5.006 -11.551 -10.381 -8.458
NLD -1.314 -0.115 6.437 -15.461 -15.289 -12.361
NOR -2.336 -0.316 5.943 -16.845 -15.982 -11.678
SWE -1.539 1.058 5.809 -14.466 -14.509 -12.173
USA -1.852 1.214 10.955 -9.127 -9.031 -6.424
CPI ∆ CPI
AUS -1.464 -1.615 -0.137 -11.416 -11.414 -11.448
BEL -1.691 -1.664 0.113 -9.514 -9.542 -9.568
CAN -1.338 -1.675 -0.605 -9.255 -9.233 -9.254
FIN -1.764 -0.897 -0.552 -9.186 -9.185 -9.204
FRA -3.264 -2.451 -0.513 -10.353 -10.382 -10.405
GBR -2.081 -2.079 -0.498 -10.487 -10.519 -10.547
GER -2.742 -2.106 -0.232 -10.351 -10.360 -10.390
JPN -1.321 -2.116 0.019 -10.213 -10.006 -10.006
NLD -2.947 -2.837 0.382 -10.473 -10.467 -10.484
NOR -3.021 -3.052 0.046 -11.478 -11.495 -11.528
SWE -2.747 -1.655 -1.364 -10.444 -10.468 -10.434
USA -2.080 -2.180 -1.244 -9.758 -9.776 -9.760
interest ∆ interest
AUS -2.698 -1.807 -1.045 -10.132 -10.098 -10.105
BEL -2.526 -1.139 -1.024 -7.440 -7.307 -7.272
CAN -2.793 -1.326 -0.946 -8.451 -8.413 -8.424
FIN -3.102 -0.325 -1.051 -13.113 -12.833 -12.700
FRA -2.759 -0.976 -0.936 -7.396 -7.232 -7.199
GBR -2.816 -1.169 -0.990 -8.488 -8.324 -8.267
GER -2.334 -1.452 -1.324 -7.050 -6.977 -6.941
JPN -2.162 -1.144 -1.448 -11.354 -11.387 -11.343
NLD -3.593 -2.375 -1.459 -11.145 -11.056 -11.035
NOR -3.543 -2.074 -1.140 -13.461 -13.385 -13.403
SWE -2.061 -1.012 -1.042 -7.859 -7.862 -7.867
USA -2.941 -1.475 -1.062 -9.189 -8.968 -8.924
unemployment ∆ unemployment
AUS -2.004 -2.201 0.194 -7.805 -7.619 -7.580
BEL -2.414 -2.874 0.641 -9.065 -8.761 -8.634
CAN -1.586 -1.514 -0.143 -7.441 -7.428 -7.449
FIN -0.695 -1.358 0.176 -6.451 -6.428 -6.424
FRA -1.518 -2.009 1.217 -9.362 -9.165 -8.914
GBR -1.514 -1.695 0.518 -5.049 -5.052 -5.084
GER -1.496 -2.271 -0.284 -14.884 -14.608 -14.588
JPN -0.735 -1.512 0.947 -10.984 -10.807 -10.603
NLD -1.955 -1.888 0.935 -7.899 -7.846 -7.758
NOR -1.259 -1.471 -0.110 -14.071 -14.064 -14.074
SWE -1.114 -0.725 0.792 -9.716 -9.768 -9.759
USA -1.456 -1.458 -0.128 -5.905 -5.923 -5.942
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Table 1: Unit root test
cons & trend constant trend cons & trend constant trend
IPI ∆ IPI
AUS -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
BEL -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
CAN -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
FIN -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
FRA -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
GBR -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
GER -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
JPN -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
NLD -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
NOR -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
SWE -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
USA -1.397 -1.430 2.876 -6.122 -6.077 -5.813
Oil / GDP ∆ Oil / GDP
AUS -1.450 -2.051 -1.355 -12.734 -12.668 -12.708
BEL -2.326 -2.665 -2.531 -13.276 -13.233 -13.046
CAN -2.012 -0.184 1.103 -5.716 -5.831 -5.812
FIN -2.335 -1.615 -2.350 -13.282 -13.317 -13.078
FRA -1.573 -1.589 -2.651 -13.667 -13.688 -13.041
GBR -1.499 -3.015 -3.183 -8.533 -8.281 -8.246
GER -1.631 -1.514 -3.044 -13.634 -13.664 -13.043
JPN -1.204 -1.662 -3.273 -13.984 -14.000 -13.128
NLD -1.855 -2.020 -1.969 -13.350 -13.321 -13.187
NOR 0.777 -1.859 -0.094 -5.057 -5.210 -4.635
SWE -1.655 -2.161 -3.342 -13.587 -13.601 -13.090
USA -1.850 -0.662 -0.712 -13.560 -13.220 -13.193
oil price ∆ oil price
AUS -2.194 -0.667 0.542 -10.208 -10.214 -10.078
BEL -1.678 -0.797 0.420 -9.746 -9.772 -9.721
CAN -2.007 -0.781 0.456 -9.917 -9.926 -9.814
FIN -1.776 -0.602 0.549 -9.882 -9.900 -9.805
FRA -1.742 -0.743 0.460 -9.639 -9.658 -9.585
GBR -1.488 -0.326 0.762 -9.754 -9.767 -9.640
GER -1.602 -0.862 0.376 -9.749 -9.778 -9.750
JPN -1.786 -1.516 -0.137 -9.603 -9.631 -9.624
NLD -1.614 -0.854 0.385 -9.766 -9.794 -9.759
NOR -1.632 -0.375 0.814 -10.040 -10.065 -9.971
SWE -1.845 -0.517 0.596 -10.076 -10.092 -9.972
USA -1.882 -0.780 0.287 -9.658 -9.681 -9.594
oil-to-energy share ∆ oil-to-energy share
AUS -0.663 -1.722 -1.481 -13.246 -13.099 -13.042
BEL -2.066 -2.968 -2.397 -13.599 -13.379 -13.169
CAN -1.172 -1.497 -2.935 -13.536 -13.537 -13.044
FIN -1.281 -1.242 -3.117 -13.623 -13.664 -13.061
FRA -0.766 -1.419 -3.592 -14.201 -14.211 -13.231
GBR -3.044 -1.652 -1.568 -13.124 -13.154 -13.038
GER -1.566 -1.547 -1.849 -13.291 -13.310 -13.144
JPN -1.344 -1.098 -2.741 -13.613 -13.641 -13.213
NLD -2.447 -3.394 -1.786 -14.025 -13.689 -13.618
NOR -1.101 -2.088 -1.138 -13.186 -13.040 -13.047
SWE -1.087 -2.598 -4.289 -14.102 -13.970 -13.095
USA -1.833 -0.587 -1.731 -13.255 -13.284 -13.079
Dickey-Fuller test whether a variable of interest follows a unit-root process. The null-hypothesis
is that the variable contains a unit-root.
Critical values: w/ constant and trend: -4.022 (1%), -3.443 (5%), -3.143 (10%); w/ constant:
-3.492 (1%), -2.886 (5%), -2.576 (10%); w/ trend: -2.593 (1%), -1.950 (5%), -1.614 (10%)
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Table 2: Information Criteria
Symmetric Asymmetric + Asymmetric - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
AUS 13.757 17.610 12.859 16.712 12.964 16.817 12.033 15.885 12.096 15.949 12.499 16.352
BEL 11.073 14.847 10.217 13.992 10.212 13.987 8.863 12.638 8.979 12.754 9.976 13.750
CAN 12.512 16.287 11.683 15.458 11.517 15.292 11.089 14.863 10.995 14.769 11.284 15.059
FIN 13.363 17.248 12.540 16.425 12.350 16.235 11.268 15.153 11.242 15.127 12.257 16.142
FRA 9.743 13.518 8.974 12.749 8.881 12.656 7.646 11.421 7.731 11.506 8.560 12.335
GBR 13.260 17.113 12.314 16.167 12.380 16.232 11.436 15.289 11.465 15.318 11.930 15.783
GER 10.123 13.897 9.181 12.956 9.364 13.139 7.959 11.734 8.279 12.053 8.920 12.695
JPN 10.460 14.234 9.737 13.512 9.758 13.532 8.276 12.051 8.267 12.042 9.328 13.103
NLD 12.365 16.140 11.497 15.271 11.571 15.346 10.294 14.069 10.306 14.081 10.926 14.700
NOR 18.029 21.882 17.213 21.066 17.007 20.860 16.335 20.188 16.414 20.267 16.954 20.807
SWE 13.614 17.499 12.901 16.787 12.607 16.493 11.559 15.444 11.564 15.449 12.662 16.547
USA 10.813 14.588 9.978 13.753 9.933 13.708 8.653 12.428 8.597 12.372 9.617 13.392
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Table 3: Direct Causality - base models
Symmetric Asymmetric Scaled Prices Net Prices
Price +/- Price + Price - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AUS 0.479 0.606 0.666 0.122 0.489 0.295
BEL 0.027** 0.002*** 0.254 0.034** 0.219 0.030**
CAN 0.115 0.324 0.027** 0.617 0.002*** 0.210
FIN 0.576 0.188 0.095* 0.119 0.107 0.178
FRA 0.358 0.380 0.051* 0.359 0.094* 0.188
GBR 0.342 0.217 0.482 0.341 0.331 0.097*
GER 0.073* 0.010*** 0.171 0.038** 0.201 0.033**
JPN 0.054* 0.169 0.000*** 0.068* 0.009*** 0.129
NLD 0.150 0.057* 0.727 0.586 0.709 0.003***
NOR 0.138 0.114 0.537 0.217 0.686 0.338
SWE 0.143 0.380 0.033** 0.709 0.196 0.875
USA 0.322 0.154 0.596 0.016** 0.541 0.385
H0: all lagged oil-price change coefficients are jointly equal to zero (αoil1 = α
oil
2 = α
oil
3 = α
oil
4 )
Values present two-sided p-value corresponding to the F-statistic result.
Table 4: Existence of moderator effect - extended models
Moderator Symmetric Asymmetric Scaled Prices Net Prices
Price +/- Price + Price - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AUS 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
BEL 0.012** 0.016** 0.015** 0.018** 0.017** 0.014**
CAN 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.015** 0.007*** 0.021** 0.005***
FIN 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.008***
FRA 0.063* 0.071* 0.039** 0.056* 0.025** 0.069*
GBR 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
GER 0.041** 0.046** 0.076* 0.055* 0.078* 0.082*
JPN 0.033** 0.026** 0.025** 0.044** 0.027** 0.034**
NLD 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.007***
NOR 0.051* 0.063* 0.064* 0.079* 0.050* 0.045**
SWE 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007***
USA 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.003***
H0: all lagged interaction term coefficients are jointly equal to zero
(ηw,21,1 = η
w,2
2,1 = η
w,2
3,1 = η
w,2
4,1 = η
w,2
1,2 = η
w,2
2,2 = η
w,2
3,2 = η
w,2
4,2 1 ≤ w < 7, w ∈ N)
Coefficient are taken from equation 3: αw,qj,t = β
w,q
j + η
w,q
j,1 · st + ηw,qj,2 · s2t
Values present two-sided p-value corresponding to the F-statistic result.
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Table 5: Indirect Causality - base models
Symmetric Asymmetric Scaled Prices Net Prices
Price +/- Price + Price - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AUS 0.005*** 0.012** 0.003*** 0.021* 0.058* 0.021**
BEL 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000***
CAN 0.104 0.195 0.052* 0.752 0.530 0.107
FIN 0.008*** 0.138 0.001*** 0.179 0.003*** 0.179
FRA 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.015** 0.021** 0.000***
GBR 0.013** 0.011** 0.009*** 0.092* 0.090* 0.181
GER 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
JPN 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
NLD 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
NOR 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.167 0.022** 0.002***
SWE 0.035** 0.216 0.000*** 0.510 0.005*** 0.088*
USA 0.052* 0.071* 0.004*** 0.163 0.010** 0.232
Indirect causality is checked by testing for block exogeneity.
Y1,t = C1 +A
′
1X1,t +A
′
2X2,t + 1,t
Y2,t = C2 +B
′
1X1,t +B
′
2X2,t + 2,t
where vector Y1 contains all variables except changes in oil prices and Y2 contains the oil-price changes. X1 is
the vector of all lagged variables of Y2 and correspondingly X2 contains all lagged values of Y2
H0: all lagged oil-price change coefficients are jointly equal to zero in all equation of the system except its own,
here A′2 = 0
Consequently, the history of the block Y2 (oil-price changes) does not help in forcasting the variable Y2.
A restricted SVAR tests for overidentifying restrictions according to the model above. The test is computed as:
LR = 2(LLvar − LLsvar)
where LR is the value of the test statistic against the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are
valid, LLvar is the log likelihood from the underlying VAR(p) model, and LLsvar is the log likelihood from the
restricted SVAR model. The results are presented as two-sided p-value corresponding to the asymptotically
distributed χ2(q) where q corresponds to the number of restrictions.
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Table 6: Accumulation of price effects
Symmetric model with shock in ∆oil
quarters AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 -0.011 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 0.004 0.015 -0.025
6 -0.009 -0.019 -0.008 -0.030 -0.018 -0.020 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 0.003 0.001 -0.031
8 -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 -0.038 -0.021 -0.019 -0.015 -0.009 -0.014 0.002 -0.001 -0.029
10 -0.002 -0.013 -0.005 -0.041 -0.019 -0.016 -0.013 -0.006 -0.014 0.003 0.000 -0.025
12 -0.001 -0.015 -0.004 -0.040 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.006 -0.015 0.003 0.002 -0.024
Asymmetric model with shock in ∆oil+
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil−
4 -0.026 0.002 0.006 -0.023 -0.007 0.009 -0.018 0.004 -0.013 -0.006 -0.017 -0.007 -0.008 0.012 -0.028 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 -0.010 0.027 0.020 0.018 -0.053 -0.002
6 -0.020 -0.001 -0.018 -0.024 -0.019 0.004 -0.045 -0.023 -0.023 -0.017 -0.034 -0.017 -0.027 0.007 -0.021 -0.003 -0.022 -0.002 -0.017 0.029 -0.006 0.013 -0.069 0.002
8 -0.020 0.003 -0.014 -0.023 -0.016 0.000 -0.054 -0.040 -0.028 -0.022 -0.031 -0.018 -0.034 0.003 -0.018 -0.006 -0.026 -0.004 -0.018 0.030 -0.010 0.011 -0.069 0.005
10 -0.012 0.008 -0.009 -0.023 -0.011 0.002 -0.055 -0.044 -0.026 -0.021 -0.027 -0.015 -0.030 0.003 -0.016 -0.004 -0.024 -0.006 -0.016 0.030 -0.007 0.011 -0.062 0.007
12 -0.007 0.008 -0.013 -0.023 -0.008 0.004 -0.053 -0.044 -0.022 -0.017 -0.023 -0.011 -0.025 0.002 -0.014 -0.004 -0.023 -0.007 -0.016 0.030 -0.004 0.013 -0.060 0.008
SOPID model with shock in ∆SOPI
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD
4 -0.049 -0.001 0.009 -0.032 -0.002 0.027 -0.096 0.009 -0.032 -0.006 -0.017 -0.002 -0.035 0.026 -0.105 0.043 -0.054 0.004 0.000 0.040 0.008 0.024 -0.113 0.011
6 -0.046 0.001 -0.025 -0.039 -0.020 0.008 -0.165 -0.043 -0.049 -0.024 -0.044 -0.017 -0.046 0.014 -0.086 0.031 -0.050 0.016 -0.003 0.039 -0.028 0.008 -0.140 0.004
8 -0.043 0.004 -0.024 -0.038 -0.019 -0.001 -0.193 -0.077 -0.057 -0.033 -0.047 -0.023 -0.056 0.009 -0.084 0.027 -0.064 0.013 0.000 0.045 -0.031 0.000 -0.139 0.003
10 -0.031 0.012 -0.016 -0.038 -0.012 0.001 -0.197 -0.091 -0.057 -0.033 -0.043 -0.019 -0.047 0.009 -0.081 0.032 -0.061 0.007 0.001 0.044 -0.028 -0.002 -0.128 0.004
12 -0.025 0.013 -0.021 -0.038 -0.007 0.003 -0.189 -0.092 -0.052 -0.029 -0.040 -0.013 -0.046 0.008 -0.079 0.032 -0.058 0.005 0.001 0.044 -0.024 0.001 -0.123 0.006
NOPI model with shock in ∆Moderator
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 -0.030 -0.013 -0.006 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 -0.017 -0.061 -0.017 -0.004 0.009 -0.054
6 -0.021 -0.044 -0.028 -0.046 -0.038 -0.041 -0.045 -0.053 -0.041 -0.016 -0.019 -0.078
8 -0.025 -0.032 -0.024 -0.053 -0.044 -0.036 -0.051 -0.044 -0.046 -0.021 -0.023 -0.074
10 -0.014 -0.021 -0.015 -0.052 -0.041 -0.028 -0.044 -0.042 -0.043 -0.020 -0.019 -0.062
12 -0.010 -0.027 -0.010 -0.046 -0.036 -0.022 -0.037 -0.041 -0.043 -0.019 -0.016 -0.058
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Table 7: Accumulation of price effects with moderators
Symmetric model with shock in ∆oil
quarters AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 0.012 0.008 0.015 0.003 0.004 -0.016 0.003 0.019 0.015 0.013 0.013 -0.008
6 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.021 -0.001 -0.026 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.002 0.005 -0.017
8 0.012 -0.004 -0.008 -0.026 -0.003 -0.026 -0.002 0.018 0.013 -0.004 -0.003 -0.019
10 0.010 -0.005 -0.009 -0.034 -0.006 -0.015 0.000 0.017 0.012 -0.003 -0.001 -0.019
12 0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.033 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.012 0.013 -0.006 0.002 -0.018
Asymmetric model with shock in ∆oil+
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil−
4 -0.013 0.022 0.022 -0.001 0.005 0.028 -0.009 0.014 0.008 -0.007 -0.041 -0.010 0.017 0.006 0.030 0.016 -0.004 0.050 -0.023 0.019 0.000 0.028 -0.016 -0.005
6 -0.034 0.006 0.012 -0.018 -0.001 0.000 -0.036 -0.033 0.012 -0.020 -0.075 -0.008 0.016 0.015 0.043 0.004 -0.009 0.057 -0.041 0.014 -0.004 0.008 -0.012 -0.016
8 -0.008 0.017 0.013 -0.021 -0.008 0.003 -0.045 -0.052 0.006 -0.026 -0.075 -0.013 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.001 -0.006 0.046 -0.054 0.010 -0.013 0.000 -0.011 -0.017
10 -0.012 0.020 0.011 -0.019 -0.012 0.008 -0.058 -0.062 0.001 -0.028 -0.065 -0.008 0.010 0.011 0.049 0.000 -0.009 0.041 -0.059 0.011 -0.015 0.005 -0.013 -0.017
12 -0.018 0.016 0.010 -0.017 -0.011 0.008 -0.060 -0.066 0.000 -0.026 -0.056 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.044 -0.002 -0.011 0.040 -0.062 0.003 -0.015 0.010 -0.015 -0.013
SOPID model with shock in ∆SOPI
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD ∆SOPI ∆SOPD
4 -0.056 0.011 0.041 0.004 0.002 0.044 -0.112 0.032 -0.003 -0.003 -0.082 -0.011 0.016 0.006 0.072 0.035 -0.069 0.126 -0.037 0.028 -0.010 0.037 -0.032 -0.019
6 -0.090 0.006 0.007 -0.020 0.000 -0.001 -0.211 -0.022 0.003 -0.020 -0.150 -0.009 -0.004 0.020 0.061 0.026 -0.068 0.140 -0.041 0.034 -0.036 0.004 -0.039 -0.056
8 -0.050 0.018 0.006 -0.026 -0.004 -0.010 -0.232 -0.054 0.000 -0.031 -0.138 -0.017 -0.015 0.014 0.049 0.024 -0.065 0.116 -0.058 0.026 -0.047 -0.010 -0.046 -0.059
10 -0.050 0.017 0.002 -0.022 -0.008 -0.004 -0.244 -0.074 0.002 -0.034 -0.107 -0.012 -0.017 0.009 0.055 0.022 -0.072 0.105 -0.065 0.028 -0.053 -0.005 -0.052 -0.046
12 -0.060 0.017 -0.001 -0.018 -0.008 0.002 -0.236 -0.079 0.002 -0.031 -0.088 -0.003 -0.019 0.001 0.056 0.018 -0.068 0.099 -0.067 0.015 -0.061 0.005 -0.056 -0.031
NOPI model with shock in ∆Moderator
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 -0.025 0.014 -0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.072 0.003 0.021 -0.019 -0.028 -0.008 -0.013
6 -0.056 -0.002 -0.014 -0.024 0.002 -0.122 0.002 0.040 -0.036 -0.064 -0.010 -0.012
8 -0.016 -0.003 -0.021 -0.048 -0.006 -0.109 -0.003 0.033 -0.030 -0.080 -0.014 -0.013
10 -0.026 -0.001 -0.024 -0.052 -0.016 -0.061 -0.004 0.029 -0.032 -0.089 -0.011 -0.014
12 -0.035 -0.003 -0.022 -0.061 -0.021 -0.017 -0.007 0.028 -0.037 -0.094 -0.011 -0.014
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Figure 2: Oil Production vs. Oil Consumption
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Figure 3: Overview of oil-to-energy share
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Figure 4: Orthogonalized IRF - Symmetric
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Figure 5: Orthogonalized IRF - Asymmetric - positive shock
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Figure 6: Orthogonalized IRF - Asymmetric - negative shock
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Figure 7: Orthogonalized IRF - SOPI
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Figure 8: Orthogonalized IRF - SOPD
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Figure 9: Orthogonalized IRF - NOPI
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Figure 10: Orthogonalized IRF with Moderator - Symmetric
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Figure 11: Orthogonalized IRF with Moderator - Asymmetric - positive shock
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Figure 12: Orthogonalized IRF with Moderator - Asymmetric - negative shock
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Figure 13: Orthogonalized IRF with Moderator - SOPI
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Figure 14: Orthogonalized IRF with Moderator - SOPD
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Figure 15: Orthogonalized IRF with Moderator - NOPI
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